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10.1  Introduction 
Concern for the current and future financial soundness of Social Secur- 
ity has led to numerous proposals which would decrease the system’s total 
obligations. Perhaps the best known proposal would raise the “normal” 
retirement age, that is, the age at which full Social Security benefits are 
paid, to 68. Its proponents argue that the proposal is reasonable since 
Americans are living longer and projected labor market demand for older 
workers will rise in the future. Best of all, by itself the proposal would go a 
long way toward restoring the financial soundness of  the system. The 
National Commission on Social Security (1981) estimates that the version 
of  the proposal which it recommends (described in greater detail below) 
would eliminate two-thirds of the long-run deficit which is equivalent to 
1.52 percent of  taxable payroll over the period 1980-2054, projected by 
the 1980 Trustee’s Report. This decrease is twice as large as that associ- 
ated with any of the additional four recommendations designed to reduce 
Social Security outlays made by the Commission. 
Some reductions in  benefits is  a necessary solution for those who 
believe the financial integrity of  the Social Security system is in danger 
and that future increases in taxes are inappropriate. Consequently, rather 
than discuss the relative merits of  tax increases versus benefit reductions, 
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this paper  takes a careful look at the effect that  a change in normal 
retirement age to 68 would have on Social Security liabilities. In addition, 
we show how different types of  beneficiaries would be affected by this 
form of  benefit reduction. 
Our major point is that the savings attributable to the proposal will not 
accrue from changes in retirement age as long as the adjustments made to 
benefits for early and delayed retirement are approximately actuarially 
fair. Rather, under a system of fair actuarial adjustments, savings will be 
because of a lifetime reduction in benefits which is independent of the age 
of retirement. Postponement of  retirement will result in additional sav- 
ings only if  workers are induced to retire so late as to be subject to less 
than  fair  actuarial  bonuses such as  those  existing under  the current 
system. If  workers cannot be induced to postpone retirement but follow 
present retirement patterns, total savings attributable to the proposal, as 
well  as the reduction  in  total  lifetime benefits experienced  by  most 
individuals, will be equivalent to those generated by an across-the-board 
reduction in benefits. These two methods of  achieving the same savings 
are distinguished however by their impact on persons who currently elect 
early retirement at ages less than 65. These workers would not be permit- 
ted to receive benefits under the proposal to raise the initial retirement 
age to 65. To the degree that they value early payments at a rate above the 
plan’s actuarial rate, they suffer additional losses. In the extreme case of 
workers who die before reaching age 65, they receive no benefits at all 
although other family members would be eligible for survivor’s benefits. 
In contrast, an across-the-board decrease in benefits (e.g., a 20 percent 
reduction in all benefits) maintaining the current provisions for early 
retirement  at age 62 is neutral with respect to mortality experience. 
Workers who elect early retirement would simply receive 20 percent less 
than under the current system. This difference has important distribu- 
tional implications to the extent that mortality experience is correlated 
with race and income status. 
A group that would be substantially affected by the proposal is low- 
wage workers who  retire  early  under  the current  system. The  Sup- 
plemental Security Income (SSI) program offsets to a large degree the 
reduction in OASI benefits for these low-wage workers thereby substan- 
tially increasing their life-cycle Social Security wealth relative to its level 
at age 65 (Burkhauser and Smeeding 1981). If  these workers are no 
longer permitted to retire nor enroll in SSI prior to age 65, they will 
experience a substantial reduction in Social Security wealth. However, 
SSI will still play an important role in protecting these workers from 
additional losses and in almost totally mitigating the losses of low-income 
workers who retire at age 65 under the current rules. This is the case 
because, then as now, SSI will offset the actuarial reductions for workers 
retiring at age 65-68. To the extent that low-wage workers are eligible for 361  Raising the Normal Retirement Age 
and choose to enroll in SSI, the program shifts the burden of the proposal 
to medium- and high-wage workers. 
The  remainder of this paper develops these points as follows. In section 
10.2 we summarize our methodology, which employs a life-cycle analytic 
framework, and outline the calculation of  the measures  used  in  the 
comparison of the costs of  current and proposed legislation. In section 
10.3 we describe the National Commission proposals and simulate their 
effect on the costs and income distribution of Social Security. Qualifica- 
tions, implications, and possible extensions of this paper are discussed in 
the concluding section. 
10.2  Methodology 
In this paper we evaluate the effects of  a change in benefit rules using 
the lifetime of individual workers as the relevant period of  analysis. Our 
measure of  the savings attributable to the proposal is the change in 
worker’s Social Security wealth (WR),  that is, the present value of future 
benefits at the time of retirement. We do not attempt to compute total 
savings across the retired population to the system, but rather concen- 
trate on the effect of  the proposal on representative workers. 
This multiperiod measure is preferred to a single-period measure be- 
cause the latter may be positive in the initial years of  an individual’s 
retirement (between age 62 and 65, for instance, when no benefits are 
paid out under the proposal) only to become negative for the balance and 
majority of his retirement. The outcome of a single-period analysis which 
aggregates across individuals at different stages of retirement in a particu- 
lar year is dependent on the distribution of the retired population by time 
elapsing since retirement. In years when the proposal delays the retire- 
ment of large numbers of workers age 62-65 relative to those retired, the 
savings attributable to  the  proposal would appear quite large. In contrast, 
if the cohort of workers forced to postpone retirement is small relative to 
those retired, a single-period measure could show increased costs. Hav- 
ing shown how the proposal affects the Social Security wealth of workers 
with different wage histories, we separate this wealth into two parts- 
wealth based on total lifetime Social Security contribution by the worker 
and his employer and wealth based on welfare transfers-and  see how 
this mix of annuity and redistribution in the system is affected. Finally we 
look at how this mix is affected when SSI is considered. 
The specific measures used in our analysis are Social Security wealth 
(W) at retirement age (R),  the present value of  all contributions to the 
system at retirement age (C,), and the welfare transfer component of 
Social Security wealth (T,). Each of these measures (WR,  C,, and TR)  is 
computed for three hypothetical workers who can retire at various ages: 
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workers earning in each year of  their work life the minimum wage, the 
median wage for all covered male workers, and the maximum wage as 
defined by  the maximum taxable earnings base.  In our examples we 
assume all workers were  age 62  in  1982, and all present values are 
evaluated from 1982. 
Social Security wealth at the point of  retirement (WR)  is equal to the 
sum of  expected OASI benefits (bR)  over the worker’s remaining life 
discounted by the probability of survival (pk) in each period (k)  and the 
interest rate (d): 
Expected OASI benefits (bR)  are calculated, as described in the appen- 
dix, from hypothetical wage histories beginning with 1951  and continuing 
through to the year of retirement. Possible years of retirement are 1982, 
1985, 1988, and  1991. For years before  1978, annual wages for the 
minimum wage earner equal the statutory minimum wage times 2000 
hours. Annual earnings for the median wage earner in years prior to 1978 
are equal to the median wage of the cohort of male earners age 30-34  in 
1951  in covered employment. Annual earnings for the high-wage worker 
in years prior to 1983 are equal to the maximum taxable earnings base in 
each year respectively. Annual wages must be projected for years after 
1982 for the maximum-wage earner and for years after  1977 for the 
minimum- and median-wage earners. For the time interval ending in 
1982, wages are projected forward by the rate of growth in wages for the 
period  1951 through the last year of  reported wages. We assume real 
annual wage  growth of  2 percent for years after 1982. The Primary 
Insurance Amounts  (PIA), derived  from Average  Indexed Monthly 
Earnings (AIME) based on these wage histories, are adjusted by a series 
of actuarial factors representing a variety of early and delayed retirement 
options. A full discussion of  these derivations is provided in the appen- 
dix. Eight scenarios are simulated for each type of  worker (see table 
10.1). The life expectancies employed are for males and are taken from 
Bureau of Vital Statistics figures for 1972. The discount rate (d)  assumed 
three values alternately: 2, 5,  and 10 percent. The tables shown in the 
next section assume a rate of  2 percent. 
The value of the individual’s total contributions at the point of retire- 
ment (C,) is equal to the sum of  annual OASI taxes paid both by the 
individual (tak  wk)  and by the individual’s  employer (tbk wk) compounded 
by a rate of  interest (9):  Thus, 
Y  -  1938  Y  -  1938 
cR=  2  Wk(tak+tbk)  (1 +I;.), 
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where Y is equal to the  year of retirement. The  wages employed are those 
in the hypothetical wage histories. The tax rates are equal to the legally 
specified contribution rates for OASI in each year. The rate of interest (tj) 
is equal to the interest rate on U.S.  Government Bonds prevailing in each 
year. Interest rates were projected for years after 1977  following the same 
procedure used to  project wages. This is only one of  several possible rates 
that could have been used. The rate of return resulting from use of bond 
rates is lower than  that resulting from other alternatives such as the 
annual yield plus the rate of  increase in average stock prices. 
The welfare transfer component of Social Security (  T,)  is equal to the 
difference between the Social Security wealth (W,) and lifetime contribu- 
tions (CR). 
The ultimate savings of the proposal to the system will depend on the 
labor force response of older workers. We do not attempt to predict that 
response in our simulations. Rather we calculate the value of  the vari- 
ables defined above for a range of retirement ages which include the most 
important possibilities. Thus our simulations yield estimates of the poten- 
tial savings associated with a wide range of  responses. Not only do we 
identify the savings that will accrue if workers choose to retire at the same 
age under the proposal  as under current law, but we  also show how 
savings vary when workers opt for different retirement ages. 
10.3  Results 
Several proposals to raise the normal retirement age have been aired at 
public forums. Among these, we have chosen to focus on that recom- 
mended by the National Commission on Social Security, primarily be- 
cause it is more fully specified than most and because it has been the 
subject of  careful analysis. The specifics of  the proposal are as follows: 
1. The earliest age of eligibility for full retirement benefits should be 
raised from 65 to 68. 
2.  The age at which reduced benefits are available should be raised 
from 62 to 65? 
3. The age at which the earnings test no longer applies should be raised 
from 72 to 75. 
4. The asymmetry between the reduction for early retirement and 
credit for delayed retirement should be eliminated either by raising the 
credit to its actuarial equivalent, or by  raising the credit by  a smaller 
factor and by increasing the reduction. 
The Commission recommends a gradual phase-in of its proposal begin- 
ning in January 2001 with full implementation in 2012. Our simulations 
reports its effect assuming full implementation in 1982. 
Table 10.1 presents eight different scenarios simulated for low-, me- 



































(4)  (7) 
Annual  WK 
(bK)  2%  5%  10% 
Benefit 
(a) Low-Wage Worker 
$2,801  $35,341  $28,200  $20,978 
3,550  33,941  25,188  16,483 
3,934  27,366  18,782  10,672 
2,241  28,273  22,560  16,782 
2,876  27,360  20,273  13,228 
3,610  24,990  17,123  9,693 
4,016  19,036  11,900  5,629 
























































1  .OO 
1.09 
1.28 
(b) Median-Wage Worker 
$5,108  $64,450 
6,453  61,268 
7,121  48,230 
4,086  51,561 
5,227  49,305 
6,533  43,930 
7,223  32,147 
8,481  38,806 
(c) High-Wage Worker 
$5,338  $67,356 
7,005  66,646 
8,026  54,740 
4,270  53,885 
5,674  53,661 
7,364  49,892 
8,451  38,025 
















































-  3,639 
"The difference between total contributions into the system and the present value of future benefits discounted at 2 percent at age 62. Contributions  equal 
$14,303, $14,530, and $14,664 for the low-, median-, and high-wage worker, respectively. 366  Jennifer L. WarlickIRichard V. Burkhauser 
eligibility for full Social Security benefits is 65, and we observe a worker’s 
Social Security benefits when he retires at ages 62,65, and 68 alternately. 
In all cases we assume that the worker is a male without a dependent 
spouse  ? 
In the next three rows we assume normal retirement is at age 68 and 
again look at the Social Security benefits of a worker who retires at ages 
62,65, and 68 evaluated at age 62. In the final two rows we again assume 
age 68 is normal, but now the worker retires at age 71. In column 3 we 
show the actuarial reduction factor used to adjust the benefits for differ- 
ent ages of acceptance. For example, row 1  refers to a worker who retires 
at age 62 and receives yearly benefits which are only 80 percent of  his 
current PIAP If he retires at age 65 he receives the full PIA, and at age 68 
he receives 1.09 of  his PIA. 
Column 4 shows the annual benefit in 1982 dollars associated with the 
wage histories of the three workers. Notice that annual benefits increase 
when a worker delays retirement. This occurs both because higher earn- 
ing years are substituted for earlier years of lower earnings in calculating 
a worker’s AIME and because the actuarial adjustment factors in column 
3 are applied to the full PIA. The next three columns show Social Security 
wealth  (WR)  evaluated at age 62 with discount rates of  2, 5, and 10 
percent. The final column shows the welfare component of  OASI (TR) 
which is  defined as the difference between  CR (not shown) and  WR 
evaluated at 2 percent (column 5). 
Notice that under current law WR  is approximately equal at a 2 percent 
rate whether benefits are accepted at age 62 or age 65 for each of  our 
workers (scenarios 1 and 2). Hence between age 62 and 65 the system 
provides only a slight penalty for those who postpone benefit acceptance. 
If  benefits are postponed to age 68, WR  falls dramatically. The system 
clearly penalizes those who postpone acceptance past age 65. At discount 
rates of 5 and 10 percent, the system penalizes postponement past age 62, 
thereby effectively reducing  net  earnings  at  later ages and  inducing 
retirement? 
10.3.1  Reductions in Social Security Wealth, 
Holding Retirement Age Constant 
The effects of  the change in normal retirement age from 65 to 68, 
holding the actual  age of  retirement  constant  at 62, can be  seen by 
comparing rows 1 and 4 of  table 10.1. In the case of  the median-wage 
worker (panel b), the annual benefit falls from $5,108 to $4,086, a decline 
of 20 percent. This must be the case since the actuarial reduction factor 
falls from .SO to .64. Notice also that Social Security wealth evaluated at 2 
percent falls from $64,450 to $51,561 or 20 percent. WR  also falls by 20 
percent in columns 6 and 7. This result does not vary with the age of 
retirement, so long as the age of retirement is unaffected by adoption of 367  Raising the Normal Retirement Age 
the proposal. For example, comparing rows 2 and 5 of  column 5 shows 
that WR  for the median-wage worker who retires at age 65 under both the 
current system and the proposal falls from $61,268 to $49,305 or by 20 
percent. The same result is obtained from rows 3 and 6 for the worker 
retiring at 68. It follows that if  the proposal does not induce a worker to 
alter his retirement plans, the change in normal retirement age has the 
same effect as a constant reduction in benefits across all periods. 
10.3.2  Changing Retirement Ages: The Actuarially Fair Case 
The National Commission proposal sets age 65  as the age of  first 
eligibility for reduced benefits, thus forcing workers who would currently 
retire at age 62 to postpone retirement for three years. As can be seen by 
comparing row 5 of column 5 with rows 1  and 4, this forced postponement 
has little additional impact on Social Security wealth. WR  now falls from 
$64,450 to $49,305 or by 23 percent, with incremental savings equaling 
only 3 percent.  Although this result is at first surprising, it is  simply 
explained by the fact that the adjustment factors for early retirement are 
actuarially fair for most workers. That is, WR  is approximately equal at all 
ages of  retirement 62 through 65. Thus the major effect of  the proposal 
results from the switch to a new set of  actuarial adjustment factors (the 
drop from .SO to .64 at age 62). So long as the factors are actuarially fair, 
little savings are to be gained by postponing retirement. Postponement of 
retirement to age 68 (row 6) caused WR  to fall by an additional 9 percent 
or a total of  32 percent, from $64,450 to $43,930. Thus the total decline 
attributable  to postponement  of  retirement from  age  62 to 68 is  12 
percent!  While this decline is certainly nontrivial and indicates that the 
proposed factors are not actuarially fair at a discount rate of 2 percent, it 
is less than what might be expected of a postponement of retirement of six 
years. Review of  the relevant values of  WR  for the low- and high-wage 
worker reveals smaller reductions from postponing retirement (9 and 6 
percent, respectively). 
10.3.3  Changing Retirement Ages: The Actuarially Unfair Case 
When the system is actuarially fair, postponing benefit acceptance does 
not affect Social Security wealth. But when the system is designed to be 
less than  actuarially fair , postponing benefit acceptance reduces WR. 
Consider the case of the median-wage worker who currently retires at 65 
(row 2). If  he retires at age 65 under the proposal (row 5), his Social 
Security wealth falls by 20 percent from $61,268 to $49,305 (column 5).  If 
he postpones benefit acceptance until age 68 (row 6), his WR  falls another 
8 percent to $43,930. Assuming that the proposal incorporates the same 
credits for delayed retirement as the current system (3 percent annually), 
postponement of benefit acceptance another three years to age 71 causes 
WR  to fall an additional 20 percent, bringing the total reduction to 48 368  Jennifer L. WarlickIRichard V. Burkhauser 
percent.  When the delayed retirement credit is raised to its actuarial 
equivalent, as proposed by the National Commission, the loss in wealth 
resulting from postponing benefits is substantially reduced. This is best 
seen by comparing rows 6,7,  and 8 of column 5.  The actuarial adjustment 
level is a critical policy parameter whose effect is not well understood. 
Table 10.2 summarizes the effect of moving normal retirement age to 
68 for age combinations shown in table 10.1. It shows the percentage 
change in Social Security wealth that would result from adoption of  the 
proposal as measured in the life-cycle framework. Panels (a), (b), and (c) 
refer to low-, median-, and high-wage workers, respectively. The results 
are generally quite similar across these different workers. The columns of 
table 10.2 refer to the age of retirement under current law while the rows 
refer to age of retirement under the proposal. The numbers in parenthe- 
ses are the actuarial reduction factors (column 3 in table 10.1). Entries 
are defined as the difference between the Social Security wealth evalu- 
ated at 2 percent paid under the respective scenario’s (column 5 in table 
10.1) divided by wealth paid under the current law. For example, for the 
median-wage worker who retires at age 62 under current and proposed 
Table 10.2  Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth Resulting from 
Raising the Normal Retirement Age to 68 
Current Law 
















(a) Low-Wage Earner 
20% 
23  20 
29  26 
46  44 
36  33 
(b) Median-Wage Earner 
20% 
23  20 
32  28 
50  48 
40  37 
* 
* 
(c) High-Wage Earner 
20%  * 
20  20 
26  25 
44  43 
















*We assume that workers do not choose to retire earlier under the proposal than under 
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law,  the  reduction  in  wealth  is  equal to 20  percent  or  ($64,450 - 
$51,561)/$64,450 (table 10.1, panel b, column 5, rows 1  and 4). 
It is evident from table 10.2 that the greatest savings to the system 
accrue from a life-cycle perspective when workers retire at later ages than 
they do under current law and actuarial adjustments remain unfair. This 
will be partly accomplished because the National Commission proposal 
would prohibit retirement at age 62. However, if  workers retired at 65 
this would have little additional affect on life-cycle savings for the system. 
Total lifetime liabilities would fall only if  such workers continue to work 
beyond age 65. 
10.3.4  Changes in Net Social Security Wealth: 
The Welfare Transfer Component of  OASI 
Implementation of the proposal would reduce Social Security wealth 
net of contributions over the life cycle, which we have called the welfare 
component of  OASI  (TR) and others would call true Social Security 
wealth (see Moffitt in this volume). If  the Social Security system resem- 
bled private sector insurance, TR  would be zero. The fact that benefits are 
only loosely related to contributions and that the system has paid benefits 
to workers as though they contributed to the system throughout their 
work lives means that most workers have received a positive TR. 
Raising the normal retirement age to 68 will reduce TR. This is seen in 
table 10.3. The table entries are derived from column 8 of table 10.1 and 
are equal to the difference in the values of  TR for the paired scenarios 
divided by TR  for the current retirement year. For example, the reduction 
experienced by our median-wage worker who retires at age 62 under both 
current law and the proposal is equal to ($29,920 -  $17,031)/$29,920  or 
43 percent.  Entries in excess of  100 percent indicate that  a positive 
welfare component under current law is replaced by a negative transfer 
component under the proposal; that is, under the proposal actual Social 
Security wealth is less than the value of  lifetime contributions into the 
system. 
A review of  table 10.3 indicates that the welfare component of Social 
Security wealth is significantly reduced under the proposal. The reduc- 
tion  increases  dramatically as retirement  is  postponed  past  65.  Our 
median-wage worker currently retiring at 62 would see TR cut in half if he 
retired  at 65 under  the proposal.  Postponement of  retirement to 71 
completely eliminates TR (a reduction of 108  percent) and leaves him with 
Social Security wealth ($32,147) which equals only 93 percent of  con- 
tributions ($34,530). Table 10.3 suggests that the proposal to raise the 
normal retirement age to 68 would have the effect of  bringing Social 
Security benefits much closer to what might now be obtained in a private 
insurance system and for some workers might actually result in benefits 
below those obtainable in the private sector. 370  Jennifer L. Warlick/Richard  V. Burkhauser 
Table 10.3  Percentage Reduction in  the Portion of a Worker’s Social Security 
Wealth Representing a Welfare Transfer 
Current Law 
62 (.80)  65 (1.00)  68 (1.09) 
















(a) Low-Wage Earner 
34% 
38  34 
49  46 
78  76 
60  57 
(b) Median-Wage Earner 
43%  * 
51  45 
69  65 
108  109 
86  84 
(c) High-Wage Earner 
52% 
53  52 
68  79 
114  115 


















*See note at table 10.2. 
10.3.5  How Changes in Interest Rates Affect Workers’ Wealth 
Up to this point we have assumed that all workers have a discount rate 
of  2 percent. While it is true that a 2 percent real rate may  be the 
appropriate market value of future benefits, or in the case of the govern- 
ment, the appropriate opportunity cost of  current liability, it is not clear 
that it is appropriate as a measure of  all workers’ discount rates.’ In the 
case where low-wage  workers have a higher discount rate than high-wage 
workers and are unable to borrow against their Social Security wealth, 
the picture changes dramatically. Now rather than being virtually indif- 
ferent between taking benefits between age 62 and 65, as was the case at 2 
percent, low-wage workers who wait until age 65 to retire experience 
significant reductions in their Social Security wealth. Under current law, 
W, at age 65 is 11 and 21 percent less than at age 62 for discount rates of 5 
and 10 percent, respectively (table 10.1, columns 6 and 7, rows 1  and 2). 
At a 5 percent discount rate, a worker who currently retires at 62 but is 
forced to retire at 65 under the proposal faces a 28 percent reduction in 
W, ([$28,200 -  $20,273]/$28,200)  compared to a 23 percent reduction at 
a discount rate of  2 percent. This reduction of  28 percent is 40 percent 371  Raising the Normal Retirement Age 
more than his high-wage counterpart’s reduction  (table 10.2, row 2, 
column 1). At 10 percent he loses 37 percent of  W, or 85 percent more 
than his high-wage  counterparts. The losses for postponement past age 65 
are even greater. A similar result would occur if  low-wage earners had 
systematically higher mortality rates than their higher wage counterparts. 
In either of these cases, workers with higher discount rates would prefer 
across-the-board benefit cuts to increases in normal retirement age. 
10.3.6  The Interaction of  OASI and SSI 
This effect is mitigated to some degree when the Supplemental Security 
Income program  (SSI) is brought into the analysis. SSI is a federally 
funded guaranteed income program for the low-income aged (65 and 
over), blind, and disabled. Although eligibility for SSI is conditioned on 
both income and assets, persons 65 years and older may continue to  work 
and still be eligible for SSI benefits. The first $65 of  earnings per month 
are totally disregarded and each additional dollar of earnings in excess of 
$65 reduces the guarantee by fifty cents. Thus in 1982, an aged worker 
with no other income could earn up to $7488 and still be eligible for SSI. 
After an initial disregard of  $20 per  month, Social Security benefits 
reduce the SSI guarantee dollar for dollar. Whether working or retired, 
the hypothetical low-wage worker in our simulations is eligible for SSI 
benefits under each of the eight scenarios except number 2.8 Although it is 
true that almost half of those aged persons eligible for SSI choose not to 
participate (Warlick 1982), the picture created by panel (a) of table 10.1 
is inappropriate for the low-income  worker who is eligible for and accepts 
SSI. Consequently, in table 10.4  we simulate the case of such a low-wage 
worker. SSI benefits have been added to OASI benefits in the calculation 
of the total annual benefit (column 4)  and the combined value of SSI and 
OASI wealth (WA)  (columns 5,  6, 7). 
The interaction of  SSI and OASI has two important effects on our 
low-wage worker. First, the addition of SSI substantially increases com- 
bined OASI and SSI wealth. For instance in the case of early retirement 
(scenario 1) W, evaluated at 2 percent increases from $35,341 in table 
10.1 to $41,969 in table 10.4 when SSI is included. 
Second, it substantially alters the relative values of  WA across scenar- 
ios. This change in WA is confirmed by  comparing table 10.2 with table 
10.5. The entries in table 10.5 are constructed in the same manner as 
those in table 10.2,  with each entry defined as the difference in WA for the 
relevant pairs of  scenarios divided by Wh for the current age of retire- 
ment. Under current law, a low-wage worker retiring at age 62 receives 
$2801 in OASI benefits at ages 62-64 (table 10.1, scenario 1). At age 65 
and over, his annual OASI benefit is supplemented by $679 of SSI. Total 
Social Security wealth (WA)  evaluated at 2 percent is equal to $41,969 
rather than the $35,341 shown in table 10.1. If  this worker postpones Table 10.4  Simulation Results Including SSI for a Low-Wage Worker 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Age of  Full  Actuarial 
Retire-  Benefits  Adjust-  Annual 
ment  Available  ment  Benefit  Component 
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*Benefit at ages 6244 consists only of  OASI benefits and equals $2,801. 
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Table 10.5  Percentage Change in Total System Benefits to a Low-Wage Worker 
Resulting from Raising the Normal Retirement Age to 68 
Current Law 
Proposal  62 (.go)  65 (1.00)  68 (1.09) 
62 ( .64)  4% 
65 (  .81)  21  2 
68 (1.00)  36  21  8 
*  * 
* 
71 (1.09)  50  38  29 
71 (1.28)  41  28  16 
*See note at table 10.2. 
retirement to age 65 (scenario 2) he receives annual OASI benefits of 
$3550, an amount too large for him to be eligible for SSI. Wh in this case is 
$33,941. Thus postponement of retirement in the presence of SSI reduces 
Wh by 21 percent compared to the world without SSI in which wealth is 
approximately equal at 2 percent whether benefits are accepted at age 62 
or age 65. 
Thus the age of  first eligibility critically affects low-wage workers. If 
these workers are no longer permitted to retire prior to age 65, they will 
experience a 21 percent reduction in Social Security wealth (Wh)  regard- 
less of  SSI (see table 10.5, row 2, column 1). In contrast, if  they are 
permitted to retire at age 62, SSI will continue to offset the actuarial 
reduction  and they will  experience only a small decline in wealth  (4 
percent). Even if  low-wage workers are not permitted to retire prior to 
age 65, SSI will play an important part in protecting those workers from 
additional losses and in almost totally mitigating the losses of  low-wage 
workers who retire at age 65 under the current rules. Notice in table 10.5 
that a worker who retires at age 65 under the proposal is only 2 percent 
worse-off than he is under current law. This is the case because SSI offsets 
the actuarial adjustment between ages 65 and 68 in the same manner that 
it does for workers who take benefits early under the current law. Com- 
paring scenarios 2 and 5 of  table  10.4 shows that  Wh evaluated at 2 
percent falls by a mere 2 percent from $33,941 to $33,258. Thus, although 
a proposal disallowing acceptance at age 62 would significantly disadvan- 
tage low-wage workers who would currently opt for early retirement, 
low-wage workers who would  retire at 65 under both systems could 
protect themselves from the substantial reductions experienced by their 
high-wage counterparts by enrolling in SSI. 
Because SSI benefits are financed by general revenues and OASI by 
the payroll tax, the increased use of  SSI by those receiving low OASI 
benefits will shift the revenue burden of supporting such workers toward 
general revenues. Therefore the effect on OASI savings in table 10.2 
greatly overestimates the savings on total revenues. In addition, to the 374  Jennifer L. Warlick /Richard V. Burkhauser 
degree that low-wage workers currently take OASI benefits at age 62, 
table 10.5 shows that virtually no savings will occur unless the option to 
receive benefits at age 62 is removed from OASI. 
10.4  Conclusion, Qualifications, and Policy Implications 
In this paper we have estimated a life-cycle measure of the savings that 
would accrue from implementation of the proposal of the National Com- 
mission on Social Security to raise the normal retirement age to 68. Our 
estimates reveal that the greatest savings accrue when workers elect to 
retire at later ages under the proposal than under current law and when 
delayed retirement credits are less than actuarially fair. It remains to be 
seen how workers will adjust their retirement decisions in response to a 
higher retirement age. Clearly an unexpected change in Social Security 
wealth will lower the wealth of  individuals and lead them to work more 
than they anticipated over the life cycle. The closer they are to their 
planned retirement age when this occurs, the more likely they are to 
postpone retirement rather than work more hours per year. But this 
increase in years of work would be offset to some degree by actuarially 
unfair Social Security adjustments. For instance, workers with discount 
rates greater than 2 percent are likely to accept Social Security benefits 
before age 68. The same is true for low-wage workers eligible for SSI. 
Postponing normal retirement is in many ways the equivalent of  an 
across-the-board  reduction  in benefits, and both types of  cuts would 
substantially reduce the welfare component of Social Security causing the 
system to yield benefits much closer to those provided by private insur- 
ance. But if  low-wage workers have higher discount rates or lower life 
expectancies than their higher-wage counterparts, postponing the age of 
Social Security acceptance as a means of reducing benefits puts a dispro- 
portionate  burden  on  low-wage workers  and  is  clearly worse  than 
across-the-board cuts in benefits from their perspective. This burden is 
mitigated by SSI for those low-wage workers who choose to participate in 
this program, especially if  OASI acceptance at age 62 is still allowed. But 
obstacles such as the lack of information, the stigma of welfare receipt, 
and the complexity of the enrollment process currently discourage almost 
one-half of  all eligible aged persons from participating in SSI. 
These conclusions require qualifications  on several grounds. First, they 
are based on simulations for hypothetical workers with low-, median-, 
and high-wage histories which may not reflect the actual experience of 
current or future beneficiaries. Interpretation of  the results for the me- 
dian-wage earner requires special caution because the median earnings 
used in the calculations are a mixture of  the earnings for part-time and 
full-time workers, rather than the earnings of a worker in the approxi- 375  Raising the Normal Retirement Age 
mate middle  of  the earnings distribution  (Schulz 1981). Second, the 
simulation results are sensitive to the assumptions regarding the interest 
rate at which contributions are compounded, the method used to project 
earnings records into the future, and life expectancies used in the calcula- 
tion of Social Security wealth. The percentage changes in Social Security 
benefits (table 10.2) show only slight sensitivity to the choice of discount 
rate, however.  Third, the simulations refer to the cohort of  workers 
attaining age 62 in 1982. It is likely that future cohorts will do slightly 
worse and thus more workers will have negative TR. 
In light of  these qualifications an obvious extension of  this paper is to 
repeat the simulations with the earnings histories of actual workers from 
the entire distribution of  earnings. So doing would allow examination of 
the redistributive effects of the proposal across workers occupying differ- 
ent positions in the income distribution  and of  different marital  and 
entitlement status. 
Three policy implications flow from these conclusions. First, our analy- 
sis indicates that the largest savings accrue only when workers postpone 
retirement  past  age 68.  While the fall in Social Security wealth will 
increase work effort, it is still the case that, given the option, workers will 
tend to preserve their diminished Social Security wealth by taking it at the 
earliest age possible. Hence few workers are likely to wait until age 68 or 
beyond to retire. Workers would be more likely to retire past 68 if  the 
National Commission’s proposal to increase actuarial adjustments past 
this age were achieved, but to do this would reduce system savings. 
Second, up to this point in the history of the system virtually all workers 
have received a positive TR. As Moffitt shows (this volume) and as we 
showed in Burkhauser and Warlick (1981), TR is falling. Raising the 
normal retirement age to 68 will substantially reduce TR for all workers 
within OASI. For low-income workers, however, the welfare transfer 
aspect of OASI will to a larger degree be picked up by SSI, if  they apply 
for benefits and if  OASI benefits are still available at age 62. For those 
who favor a disentangling of the annuity and redistributive goals of OASI 
this is a plus, but for others it is another example of a two-track system in 
which the poor are singled out for stigma-inducing treatment. For those 
concerned with overall budget reductions, we show that OASI savings 
will be offset to some degree by increases in SSI. 
Finally, the argument has been made that portions of  Social Security 
benefits in excess of payroll tax contributions should be subject to income 
taxation (Levy 1980). Because high-wage as well as low-wage earners 
receive substantial transfers under the current system, taxing this compo- 
nent of Social Security benefits would redistribute benefits toward those 
with the greatest need. The general decline of  the transfer component 
under the most likely of the proposal scenarios and its total elimination 
for some median- and high-wage earners mitigates this argument. 376  Jennifer L. Warlick/Richard  V. Burkhauser 
Appendix 
Under current law, monthly retirement benefits are derived from a figure 
referred to as the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)  P The PIA is based on 
an individual’s earnings averaged over the work life (AIME). Earnings 
for years 1951  up to and including the year the individual becomes eligible 
for benefits (currently age 60) are indexed to compensate older workers 
for general increases in real wages and in the taxable wage base under 
Social Security which  would otherwise advantage younger  (disabled) 
workers. The index in each year is equal to the ratio of median earnings of 
the covered population in the year the worker reaches age 60 to median 
wages in that year. Earnings for the year in which the worker becomes 60 
and all years thereafter up to the year of retirement are not indexed. Not 
all years are included in the calculation of  AIME. The number of  years 
averaged  (the “computation years”)  is equal to the number of  years 
which elapsed between  1951 or the individual’s twenty-first birthday, 
whichever is later, and the year in which the individual reaches age 62, 
minus five. Thus the number of  computation years for the individuals 
reaching age 62 in 1982 in our examples is 26 (1982 - 1951 = 31 -  5 = 
26); for an individual reaching 62 in 1985,28  years are used, and so on up 
to a maximum of 35 for cohorts reaching 62 in 1991  and later. Years with 
the highest earnings are selected for the computation years. Any years up 
to the year of  retirement may be included. AIME is equal to the total 
earnings (some of  which will be indexed) in the “computation years” 
divided by the number of  months in those years. AIME may be recom- 
puted in years following retirement to take account of  high earnings in 
those years if  doing so increases AIME. AIME cannot be lowered by 
low-earning years subsequent to retirement. 
For individuals who become eligible for retirement in 1979 or later, the 
PIA is determined by application of  a mathematical formula to AIME. 
The formula is progressive, that is, the percentage of AIME replaced by 
benefits declines as average earnings rise. For individuals reaching age 62 
in 1979 the formula is 90 percent  of  the first $180 of  AIME, plus 32 
percent of AIME over $180 and through $1085, plus 15 percent of AIME 
in excess of $1085. The dollar amounts in this formula, denoted the “bend 
points,” are automatically adjusted on an annual basis for increases in 
average wages. 
The normal age of  retirement, that is, that age at which an individual 
may draw a benefit equal to 100 percent of PIA, is currently 65.‘” Workers 
may elect to receive benefits as early as age 62, but benefits are reduced 
by  5/9 of  1 percent for each month of  entitlement before age 65 (6.67 
percent annually), reflecting the fact that they will be paid over a longer 
period of  time. The reduction  approaches actuarial fairness for most 
workers; that  is,  the present  value  of  future  benefits paid  over the 377  Raising the Normal Retirement Age 
remaining lifetime of the beneficiary is approximately the same at any age 
of  first receipt age 62 through 65. 
An individual who wishes to work past the normal age of  retirement 
can choose to delay receipt of benefits. This is desirable because benefits 
are reduced for earnings in excess of  a specified limit  (the  “exempt 
amount”) for workers less than age 72.” In the event that an individual 
delays retirement, benefits are increased by  1/12  of  1  percent of PIA for 
each month (3 percent annually) that benefits are not drawn between 
ages 65 and 72. This credit is less than actuarially fair: Individuals de- 
laying retirement cannot hope to recoup foregone benefits over their 
remaining lifetimes. 
Notes 
1. This assumes that the full incidence of  the Social Security payroll tax is shifted to the 
employer following Brittain (1971). In contrast, Hamermesh (1979) and Vroman (1971) 
suggest that the tax is only partially shifted onto labor. 
2.  Under the proposal, earnings would continue to be indexed up to and including the 
second year of first eligibility, but the age defined by this rule would rise from 60 to 63. The 
period for computing the AIME would be measured at age 62 so that the maximum number 
of  years to be averaged would remain 35 (National Commission on Social Security 1981). 
3. As seen in Moffitt (this volume),  the  number  of  couples earning Social Security 
benefits in their own right makes this the dominant case. The increasing work effort of 
women will continue the trend away from dependent spouse benefits. Another action that 
will further this trend is the move toward earnings sharing which would end spouse benefits 
and replace them with equally shared earnings records of a married couple. 
4.  Reduction factors of  .64, .81, and 1.28 are used in rows 4, 5, and 8 following the 
National Commission, which asserts that when using a 2 percent real discount rate these are 
the actuarially fair rates. The adjustment factor of  1.09 in rows 3 and 7 is not actuarially fair 
but is used currently by Social Security to adjust PIA for retirement  past age 65. 
5. There is a growing literature on the effects of  Social Security on labor supply. See 
Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) for an excellent review of this literature. 
6. In an actuarially fair system, WR  would be equal at all ages of retirement. Although we 
have employed  the schedule of  adjustment  factors designated as actuarially fair by the 
National Commission, the results of  our simulations show that they are only approximately 
fair for our hypothetical workers at discount rates of  2, 5, and 10 percent.  This result 
underscores the importance of  the worker’s discount rate in his evaluation of  the relative 
value of  WR  at different ages of  retirement. 
7. As Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980 and 1981) and Burkhauser and Turner (1981) 
show, evaluating Social Security wealth and its effect on work depends critically on the 
interest rate employed. 
8.  In  the simulations, the size of the SSI benefit vanes with annual earnings until the time 
of retirement, at which point it is fixed in real terms. SSI benefit levels for future years are 
projected from 1982 at a rate equal to the historic rate of  growth of low-income wages less 1 
percent. We assume that wages are the sole source of  income until the time of retirement. 
We assume Social Security benefits are the sole source of non-SSI income during retire- 
ment. 378  Jennifer L. Warlick /Richard V. Burkhauser 
9. The description of current law is taken from U.S.  Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (1978). 
10. Benefits drawn at age 65 may be less than 100 percent of PIA if  the individual has 
earnings in excess of the exempt amount under the earnings test. If  the individual is married 
to someone who is not entitled to benefits in his or her own right, total benefits to the couple 
will equal 150 percent of PIA. 
11. Beneficiaries between ages 65 and 72 can earn $5,500 in 1982 without affecting the 
amount of  their benefits. The amount of exempt earnings for persons under 65 is $3960. 
Benefits are reduced by $0.50 for each $1.00 of  earnings above the exempt amount. 
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